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Security Policy and Developments in Central Asia 
Security documents compared with security challenges 
 
Marcel de Haas 
 
This article examines the security policy of the Central Asian (CA) states, by 
comparing theory (security documents) with practice (the actual security challenges). 
The lack of CA regional (security) cooperation and authoritarian rule puts political and 
economic stability at stake. The internal and external threats are partly caused by the 
CA regimes themselves: political opposition groups are often described as terrorists, 
and/or blamed to be connected to Islamic State (IS). There is hardly any effort 
towards improving social-economic circumstances, which would take away grounds 
for (Islamic) radicalization. Moreover, the CA governments are themselves 
responsible for regional border, water and energy disputes. Political unrest and 
radicalization, IS, as well as terrorism and drugs from Afghanistan could become 
serious threats to the survival of CA governments. 
 
Introduction 
This research is aimed at determining if the statements the CA governments make in their 
documents on security policy are in line with the current security situation in the region. Do 
the CA security documents provide sufficient direction for national security, or are additional 
measures required? First, I will describe the structure of security documents in each of the 
CA states and their typical national views on security. Subsequently, I will compare each 
type of security document (Constitutions, National Security Strategies/Concepts, Military 
Doctrines and Foreign Policy Concepts) for all CA states, through the contents of their main 
topics, i.e. national interests, threats and measures to ensure national security. Then, I will 
analyse the total of all security documents of all CA states according to the aforementioned 
main topics. Finally, I will provide an assessment of the contents of the CA security 
documents versus actual security developments in the region. 
 
Each CA state has a set of security documents available for conducting its security policy. 
Per CA country there is some variety in the type of documents. Some states have a National 
Security Strategy (NSS) as political or grand strategy, whereas in others a Law on National 
Security acts as the highest security paper. Furthermore, some CA governments publish all 
their security documents, whereas others have apparently reasons to keep one or more 
papers classified. Pertaining to transparency of security documents, Kyrgyzstan and 
Tajikistan are the most open states; they publish all their security documents. Next is 
Kazakhstan, which only keeps it NSS classified. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan appear as 
the most closed countries, they hold more than one of their security documents secret. 
Moreover, some CA states keep their security documents more up-to-date than others. 
Kazakhstan, for instance, has versions of its security documents that are quite recent. In 
contrast, some of the security documents of Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are outdated, 
being drafted in the mid-1990s. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan take a middle position, with some 
of the documents of recent date and some of around a decade ago. 
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Kazakhstan 
According to Kazakhstan’s Foreign Policy Concept (FPC), its security policy is based on five 
documents: the Constitution (1995/2007), the Military Doctrine (2011), the Law on National 
Security (2012), the Kazakhstan-2050 Strategy (2012) and the Foreign Policy Concept 
(2014) itself.1 With the exception of the 2050-Strategy, most countries publish the 
aforementioned types of security documents. The 2050-Strategy of Kazakhstan is the 
exception to the rule, presenting a comprehensive state program for all segments of society, 
for the decades ahead. Usually, a state has an overall NSS. The Kazakh Law on National 
Security mentions such a NSS, however, a foreign publication testifies that this document is 
classified.2 This was also confirmed to the author by high-ranking Kazakh military officers. 
The reason for the classification of the NSS is probably because this document contains 
specific measures in response to violations of the national security of Kazakhstan, which the 
authorities do not want to disclose to leave any adversary (internal or external) in doubt as to 
what to expect. However, Kazakhstan’s Law on National Security covers all aspects of a 
NSS: security types; national interests; policy objectives; threats; and responsibilities for 
ensuring national security. 
With regard to national views in its security documents, different from the common CA 
assessments, Astana repeatedly focusses attention on the (delimitation of the) Caspian Sea. 
The energy resources in this basin are crucial for Kazakhstan’s economy. Therefore, the 
borders of the Caspian littoral states need to be agreed to avoid disputes which could disrupt 
the exploitation of the energy resources. For this reason – energy resources being a vital 
asset of its economic power – Kazakhstan also reiterates the protection of its energy sector. 
Kyrgyzstan 
On 12 June 2012, Kyrgyzstan’s President Almazbek Atambayev signed into law the 
country’s new National Security Concept (NSC).3 Subsequently, a National Sustainable 
Development Strategy of the Kyrgyz Republic for the period 2013-2017 was approved by 
Presidential Decree of 21 January 2013. This strategy entails social-economic measures for 
the following five years. Besides these two strategies, Kyrgyzstan has at its disposal a 
Military Doctrine of 2013 and a FPC of 2007. All documents are public.4  
Concerning national Kyrgyz viewpoints, prominently comes to the fore Bishkek’s (security, 
energy, economic and political) cooperation with Moscow. This cooperation with Russia is of 
                                               
1 Constitution of the Republic of Kazakhstan (30 August 1995) http://www.parlam.kz/en/constitution 
(accessed 7 November 2015); Voennaya doktrina Respubliki Kazakhstan (11 October 2011) 
http://mod.gov.kz/rus/dokumenty/voennaya_doktrina/ (accessed 7 November 2015); Zakon o 
natsional’noy bezopasnosti Respubliki Kazakhstan (6 January 2012) 
http://mod.gov.kz/rus/dokumenty/zakony/vse_zakony/?cid=0&rid=281 (accessed 7 November 2015); 
Kazakhstan 2050 Strategy (15 December 2012) 
http://www.akorda.kz/ru/official_documents/strategies_and_programs (accessed 7 November 2015); 
Foreign Policy Concept for 2014 – 2020 (25 April 2014) 
http://www.kazembassy.nl/index.php/en/about-kazakhstan/foreign-policy/foreign-policy-concept-for-
2014-2020 (accessed 7 November 2015). 
2 R. McDermott, Kazakhstan’s 2011 Military Doctrine: Reassessing Regional and International 
Security (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, USA: Foreign Military Studies Office August 2012) p. 7. 
3 R. McDermott, ‘Kyrgyzstan’s National Security Concept Legally Enshrines Strategic Balance’, 
Eurasia Daily Monitor (EDM), 9/149 (6 August 2012). 
4 Kontseptsiya national’noy bezopasnosti Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki (12 June 2012) 
http://www.vesti.kg/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&id=13270&Itemid=117 (accessed 7 
November 2015); National’naya strategiya ustoychivogo razvitiya Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki na period 
2013-2017 (21 January 2013) 
http://www.president.kg/ru/news/ukazy/1466_tekst_natsionalnoy_strategii_ustoychivogo_razvitiya_kyi
rgyizskoy_respubliki_na_period_2013-2017_godyi/ (accessed 7 November 2015); Voennaya doktrina 
Kyrgyzskoy Respubliki (22 July 2013) http://www.centrasia.ru/newsA.php?st=1374474180 (accessed 
7 November 2015); Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki KR (10 January 2007) http://mfa-
osh.kg/pravovayabase/1065-koncepciya-vneshney-politiki-kr.html#.VgkIe4voveQ (accessed 7 
November 2015). 
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vital importance for the survival of the government, since Kyrgyzstan is a political weak state 
without energy resources. For the same reason, Bishkek also assigns much value to its 
cooperation in the Russian-led military alliance, Collective Security Treaty Organization 
(CSTO), as well as the regional Eurasian political-economic organization, the Shanghai 
Cooperation Organization (SCO). 
Tajikistan 
Tajikistan lacks a NSS. Instead, the leading security document is for Dushanbe the Law on 
National Security of 28 June 2011. In addition to this document, Tajikistan has a Military 
Doctrine of 2005 and a FPC of 2015. All security documents are disclosed.5 
With reference to national positions in its security papers, Tajikistan’s entries are similar to 
those of Kyrgyzstan. Dushanbe also has close cooperation with Moscow securing the 
survival of this political weak state, and Tajikistan too lacks energy resources. Likewise, 
Tajikistan also highly values cooperation in CSTO and SCO. 
Turkmenistan 
Turkmenistan does not have a NSS. However, its alternative, the Law on National Security 
of 4 May 2013 is only partly published. Conversely, the Turkmen Military Doctrine of 2009 
was released in full. But the Turkmen FPC of 1995 is again classified.6 
Ashgabat has one prominent national political feature which affects all its security 
documents, namely its policy of permanent neutrality. Among other things, this leads 
Turkmenistan to rejecting membership of SCO and CSTO and also to renouncing foreign 
troops and/or military bases on its territory. 
Uzbekistan 
The Concept of National Security of Uzbekistan of 29 August 1997 is not public. But the 
Military Doctrine of 1995 was released in full. Furthermore, Uzbekistan has only partly 
published its FPC of 2012.7 
Tashkent regards itself – by military and demographic might – as the leader of Central Asia, 
although Astana’s economic power is much stronger. However, this national view of regional 
leadership affects its security documents by stressing its independent, non-allied position. 
For this reason, Uzbekistan has more than once withdrawn itself from the CSTO, most 
                                               
5 Zakon Respubliki Tadzhikistan o Bezopasnosti (28 June 2011) 
http://mmk.tj/ru/library/o_bezapasnosti.doc, (accessed 7 November 2015); Voennaya doktrina 
Respubliki Tadzhikistan (3 October 2005) http://base.spinform.ru/show_doc.fwx?rgn=12243 
(accessed 7 November 2015); Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Respubliki Tadzhikistan (27 January 
2015) http://mfa.tj/ru/pravovaya-osnova-vp/kontceptciya-vneshney-politiki-respubliki-tadzhikistan.html 
(accessed 7 November 2015). 
6 Zakon o Bezopasnosti Turkmenistana (4 May 2013) 
http://base.spinform.ru/show_doc.fwx?rgn=65978 (accessed 7 November 2015); Voennaya doktrina 
nezavisimogo postoyanno neytral’nogo Turkmenistana (21 January 2009) 
http://www.turkmenbusiness.org/node/126 (accessed 7 November 2015); Kontseptsiya vneshney 
politiki Turkmenistana (March 2012). The Law on National Security (2013) is only partly public. The 
data provided here are based upon S. Aleksandrov, ‘Poleznaya strategiya‘, Nezavisimoye Voyennoye 
Obozreniye (27 May 2005). 
7 Voennaya doktrina Respubliki Uzbekistan (30 August 1995) 
http://www.lex.uz/pages/GetAct.aspx?lact_id=134026 (accessed 7 November 2015); Ob osnovnykh 
printsipakh vneshnepoliticheskoy deyatel’nosti Respubliki Uzbekistan (26 December 1996) 
http://base.spinform.ru/show_doc.fwx?rgn=801 (accessed 7 November 2015). The Concept of 
National Security of Uzbekistan (1997) is not public. The data provided here are based upon: P. 
Sidorenko, Vooruzhennyye sili Respubliki Uzbekistan (5 June 2009), http://vsemirnaya-
istoriya.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=95:armiya-uzbekistana&catid=8:istoriya-
nezavisemosti&Itemid=29 (accessed 23 October 2015); and from Strategiya natsional’noy 
bezopasnosti Respubliki Uzbekistan v Tsentral’noy Azii, http://vsemirnaya-
istoriya.ru/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=89:nacionalnayabezopasnostuzbekistana
&catid=8:istoriya-nezavisemosti&Itemid=29 (accessed 23 October 2015). 
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recently in 2012. Tashkent is fearful that CSTO armed forces might be used against Uzbek 
sovereignty. Therefore, Tashkent is anxious of CSTO or other military deployment on its 
territory, and therefore rejects the presence of foreign troops on its soil. 
 
Comparison of Central-Asian security documents by t ype 
There are a number of policy documents that a state has available for conducting its security 
policy. Documents that incorporate security aspects are Constitutions, National Security 
Strategies/Concepts (NSS) / Laws on National Security, Military Doctrines and Foreign 
Policy Concepts (FPC). In this paragraph I compare each type of security document for all 
CA states, by the contents of their main topics, i.e. national interests; threats; and measures 
to ensure national security. When in some cases the specific security document was 
classified, I have tried to extract the equivalent data from other sources (see country foot 
notes). 
Constitutions 
With regard to national interests, all the CA constitutions adhere to the principles of 
international law, e.g. by pursuing a policy of cooperation and good-neighbourly relations; 
non-interference in internal affairs; and non-use of force. Turkmenistan differs from the other 
CA states with dominating attention for its policy of permanent positive neutrality. Pertaining 
to threats, the CA constitutions only mention internal ones, not external threats. This is 
logical, because a constitution is first of all a national document. Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan have similar entries, which state that armed paramilitary groupings are 
forbidden and that political parties and other civil organizations are not allowed to threaten 
the constitutional order. Apparently, these states are fearful of a coup d’état. Concerning the 
execution of security policy, in ensuring security, the CA constitutions focus especially on the 
role of President and Parliament. The CA President is usually in charge of introducing 
martial law and a state of emergence. The CA Parliaments have in general the right to 
declare war and peace and to decide upon the deployment of the Armed Forces abroad. 
Considering the authoritarian nature of the CA regimes, it is likely that the President is fully in 
charge of executing the security policy, with the Parliament following suit. 
National Security Strategies/Concepts or Laws on National Security 
The NSS documents share strategic-security interests in: the inviolability of the constitutional 
order, sovereignty and territorial integrity; social cohesion and political and economic 
stability; as well as domestic and regional security, stability and cooperation. Kazakhstan en 
Turkmenistan mention the guaranteed functioning of the energy sector. For these countries 
the energy sector is a vital asset of their economies, which also applies to Uzbekistan. 
Turkmenistan expectedly stresses aspects of its neutrality policy. Comparing internal threats, 
the CA states agree that separatism, extremism, terrorism; crime, corruption, arms and 
drugs trafficking; as well as environmental problems and social-political instability are the 
main drivers. With the exception of Turkmenistan, all other CA states are members of the 
SCO, which considers separatism, extremism and terrorism as the most crucial threats for 
the region. Turkmenistan considers the possibility of a "colour" revolution, such as those in 
Georgia, Ukraine and Kyrgyzstan, as a threat. Again, as in its constitution, Turkmenistan 
apparently fears an overthrow. This distress might also be the consequence of its policy of 
neutrality, which isolates Turkmenistan from the rest of CA. As external threats the CA states 
consider in particular breaches of sovereignty and territorial integrity; regional armed 
conflicts, above all related to Afghanistan; terrorism; damage to the economic security, as 
well as the incomplete delineation of state borders and those of the Caspian Sea. Especially 
the threat of terror and of drugs from Afghanistan, border issues, with still a number of CA 
borders in dispute, as well as the Caspian Sea, because of the presence of energy sources 
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(for the littoral states Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan); are hot spots for conflicts and are 
rightfully regarded as threats. 
Military Doctrines 
The CA states have joint doctrinal interests in international cooperation; non-interference; 
peaceful settlement of disputes; no-first use of armed force; no enemies; no territorial claims; 
and inviolability of borders. Moreover, the doctrines underline typical military aspects, e.g. 
peaceful settlement of disputes; no-first use of armed force and no states regarded as 
enemies. As usual, Turkmenistan emphasizes its policy of permanent neutrality, which 
doctrinally subsequently leads to the rejection of Turkmenistan in participating in military 
blocs / alliances. The enumeration of internal threats lists the familiar extremism, terrorism 
and separatism, but also drugs trafficking and illegal migration. Moreover, typical military 
threats, such as supply of arms to illegal armed groups and sabotage, are also mentioned. 
As external threats the CA doctrines declare: CA regional political instability; CA regional 
border, water, energy, ethnic and religious conflicts; armed provocations; terrorism, 
separatism and extremism; proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; regional CA 
consequences of Afghanistan’s situation; states striving to influence the CA region; as well 
as military build-up by states in the region. Most notable external threats are non-military 
threats related to border, water and energy issues, as well as military-political power play in 
the region. Since all CA states regard Russia as a strategic partner, would this entry refer to 
the USA and/or China? Kazakhstan stresses information warfare and the unresolved legal 
status of the Caspian Sea. The latter makes sense, due to the energy rich contents of this 
sea and its importance for the Kazakh economy. With regard to ensuring security, the CA 
countries agree on maintaining a defence capability to counter the aforementioned threats; 
international cooperation; action against (proliferation of) weapons of mass destruction; and 
a preference for non-military measures. Militarily, with the exception of Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan, the other CA states are members of the Russian-led military alliance, the CSTO. 
The diverting policy lines of some CA states, are those with recur in most security 
documents: Kazakhstan puts emphasis on security of the Caspian region; Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan declare themselves against deployment of their forces abroad; and against 
foreign military bases/troops on its territory. 
Foreign Policy Concepts 
The CA FPCs state the usual national interests, as also mentioned in the other security 
documents: respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity and non-interference into internal 
affairs, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-use of force or threat to use force; strengthening 
the state’s international position and its image abroad; strengthening of good-neighbourly 
relations; and reinforcing the national economy. The only new aspect, but very expected for 
a FPC, is the image / reputation of the CA state abroad. Diverting views on national interests 
are that Kazakhstan stresses its Strategy-2050; Kyrgyzstan shares a lot of attention to 
international organizations (CIS, CSTO and SCO) and the vital importance for Kyrgyzstan of 
cooperation with Russia; Turkmenistan’s interests dominated by its policy of permanent 
neutrality; and Uzbekistan concerned with peace and stability in Afghanistan. FPCs, 
focussing on the international arena, obviously only mention external threats, which are the 
ordinarily anticipated ones: terrorism, extremism, illegal immigration, drugs and arms 
trafficking, as well as regional CA conflict potential on social-economic problems, border, 
water and energy issues. Kazakhstan, as usual, stresses the (undefined) legal status of the 
Caspian Sea and Kyrgyzstan rightly worries about its vulnerability caused by its dependence 
on external energy. To ensure security, the CA states mention developing intra-regional CA 
collective security cooperation, to diminish conflict and promoting energy security and 
energy independence. That is a nice statement but not entirely realistic: Uzbekistan and 
Turkmenistan refrain from joining the regional collective security structure, CSTO, and 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are the only states with energy security problems, lacking these 
sources. Not surprisingly, because of their (security and energy) dependence on Moscow, 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan once more underline the importance of  their security cooperation 
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with Russia and within CSTO and SCO. Furthermore, Kyrgyzstan stresses the value of 
Russian (and until recently US) military bases on its soil. Once more Kazakhstan 
accentuates the legal status of the Caspian Sea; Turkmenistan highlights its neutrality policy; 
and Uzbekistan reiterates its position against military blocs, and foreign troops on its soil. 
 
Security documents versus actual security developme nts 
In the previous paragraph I have compared each specific type of security document for all 
the CA states, through the contents of their standard main themes/topics. Now, I will 
describe the total of all security documents of all CA states according to the customary 
components: national interests, threats (internal and external), and measures to ensure 
national security (see Table 1). I will hold these common CA views on security policy against 
the actual security circumstances in this region. Finally, for each component, I will present an 
assessment of the comparison of security policies with security reality in CA. 
National interests 
The CA states perceive the generally recognized principles of international law as their 
national interests: respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity; international cooperation; 
good-neighbourly relations; non-interference in internal affairs; non-use of force, and political 
and economic stability. 
Adherence to principles of international law 
Respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity is violated by CA states in their disputes on 
borders, even resulting in shootings by border guards. The undisputed delimitation of state 
borders seems to be a unsolvable problem in CA. Most CA states, with the exception of 
neutral Turkmenistan, are active members of CSTO, SCO or the Eurasian Economic Union 
(EAEU), with Russia (CSTO and EAEU) and China (SCO) as lead-nations. However, when it 
comes to regional CA cooperation, disunity is the main theme. Consequently, the same 
applies to good-neighbourly relations. Especially among Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan an 
Uzbekistan tensions are substantial, caused by disputes on borders, water and energy. 
Related to this, the principle of non-interference in internal affairs is not observed either by 
especially the three aforementioned states, e.g. Uzbekistan cutting gas delivery to 
Kyrgyzstan. Likewise, non-use of force is violated by border guards shooting at each other or 
at citizens of the neighbouring state. 
Political and economic stability 
In September 2015, the former Head of Kyrgyzstan’s Security Council stated that the 
security situation in Tajikistan could threaten the aggravation of the situation in Kyrgyzstan 
and in the whole CA region. Unresolved border disputes, land - water conflicts, religious 
extremism, together with upcoming parliamentary elections in October 2015 could 
destabilize the situation in Kyrgyzstan. He explained that the armed attacks in Tajikistan of 4 
September 2015, by a group of gunmen linked to Deputy Minister of Defence Nazarzoda, 
could potentially threaten Kyrgyzstan’s south as a conflict-prone area.8 These events 
demonstrate the political weakness of especially Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, in which the 
national interests of political and economic stability are more a wish than a reality. To all CA 
states applies that conditions such as poverty, unemployment, lack of freedom and 
democracy, authoritarian rule and oppression are a breeding ground for instability. 
                                               
8 ‘Eks glava sovbeza Kyrgyzstana: Situatsiya v Tadzhikistane mozhet ugrozhat obostreniyu situatsii v 
regione’, Azia Plyus (7 September 2015) http://news.tj/ru/news/eks-glava-sovbeza-kyrgyzstana-
situatsiya-v-tadzhikistane-mozhet-ugrozhat-obostreniyu-situatsii- (accessed 16 November 2015). 
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Assessment 
In their security documents the CA states mention generally recognized principles of 
international law as their national interests. The reality is the opposite: the absence of 
regional CA cooperation, as well as their disputes in various areas demonstrate that their 
alleged observance of the aforementioned principles perhaps is (perhaps) relevant in their 
global international relations, but certainly not in their relations among each other. The lack 
of CA unity, in addition to regimes with authoritarian rule, proves that political and economic 




As threats to domestic security the CA countries recognize armed paramilitary groupings; 
separatism, extremism and terrorism; as well as arms and drugs trafficking. The CA 
governments consider as threats from abroad, regional armed conflicts, in particular related 
to Afghanistan; terrorism and extremism; as well as regional border, water, energy, ethnic 
and religious conflicts. 
Armed paramilitary groupings 
On 4 September 2015 in Tajikistan, militants, connected to Deputy Defence Minister 
Nazarzoda, fired at a police station and a weapons depot in and around Dushanbe. The 
resulting firefights with government forces ended with 22 dead and 14 arrests. The killed 
Nazarzoda was accused by the government of having links with the now banned Islamic 
Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT).9 According to the official version of events, Major-General 
Nazarzoda was acting on the orders of the IRPT, being the country’s leading opposition 
party, and hence a political threat to the current regime. Nazarzoda had stated that the 
regime plotted to remove him for refusing to agree with the government’s banning of the 
IRPT. When he heard that he was going to be targeted, Nazarzoda assembled supporters 
and decided to fight his way out. Not plots by outside forces, but disputes within the Tajik 
political elite itself caused the outbreak of violence in September 2015. 10 
Separatism, extremism and terrorism 
Extremist Islamist organizations recruit supporters from within the populations of the various 
CA countries and sometimes even from within the senior ranks of the security services and 
the military; their success comes from the values they advocate rather than because of their 
military capabilities. In October 2015, the United Nations Security Council’s Counter-
Terrorism Committee issued a report on foreign militants, which stated that the senior 
commanders of the so-called Islamic State (IS) in Syria and Iraq, include Chechens from 
Russia and militants from CA. The report stated that three terrorist organizations from the 
CA region, namely the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), the Islamic Jihad Union (IJC) 
and the Islamic Movement of Eastern Turkestan, have (had) links to Al-Qaeda.11 Uzbekistan 
carries the largest Islamist radical group, the IMU. In the meantime this terrorist grouping has 
officially declared its support for IS. IMU has 1,000 fighters, and was seemingly allied to Al 
Qaeda. IMU operates out of the north of Afghanistan and conducts operations in Kyrgyzstan, 
Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. IMU has for a long time focused on the fight against CA 
authoritarian governments, but now also concentrates on the recruiting of volunteers to fight 
                                               
9 ‘Zaderzhany eshche 14 chlenov vooruzhennoy gruppirovki Khodzhi Khalima’, Azia-Plyus (7 
September 2015) http://news.tj/ru/news/zaderzhany-eshche-14-chlenov-vooruzhennoi-gruppirovki-
khodzhi-khalima (accessed 16 November 2015). 
10 E. Lemon, ‘Tajikistan’s Government Uses Recent Violence to Neutralize Opposition’, EDM, 12 / 171 
(23 September 2015). 
11 ‘Boeviki iz Tsentral’noy Azii vkhodyat v chislo starshikh komandirov IGIL i Fronta “An-Nursa”’, 
UN.org (8 October 2015) http://www.un.org/russian/news/ru/print.asp?newsid=24675 (accessed 16 
November 2015). 
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in the Middle East. IMU is particularly active on the border with Afghanistan, where they 
joined the Taliban in skirmishes.12 The IS terrorist grouping is not yet mentioned in the CA 
security documents, since it has only appeared in 2014. Although the CA states have weak 
spots in their political regimes, due to their authoritarianism, and whilst also encountering 
ethnic and religious tension, as well as poor economic circumstances, nevertheless so far 
interest in IS has remained low. However, that could change. 
 
In May 2015 Tajik Colonel Gulmurod Khalimov appeared in an IS propaganda video, which 
delivered a shock across Central Asia. Khalimov, Head of Tajikistan's Special Assignment 
Police Unit (OMON), a key element in President Emomali Rahmon's security apparatus, had 
disappeared shortly before. In the video he promised to return to wage violent jihad. 
Furthermore, IS and other foreign fighters, such as IMU, are already operating on 
Tajikistan's southern border with Afghanistan. The Taliban are also active on the immediate 
Afghan side of the Tajik border. Spread of instability is likely to take place. Uzbekistan — 
Central Asia's most populated and most authoritarian state — and Kyrgyzstan, which has 
already experienced two coups, would be deeply troubled by serious unrest in Tajikistan.13 A 
number of Islamist groups have been outlawed, such as the IRPT by Dushanbe, which only 
sends them underground. By putting aside the relatively moderate IRPT, the Tajik President 
further alienated the devout and gave plausibility to those who argue that with other options 
closed, extremism is only the politics of last resort. Sometimes, all opposition factions are 
treated as ‘Islamist,’ to avoid criticism from the West for the suppression of civil society. Tajik 
President Rahmon, for instance, had labelled former Deputy Minister of Defence Nazarzoda 
an “Islamic State sympathizer,” who tried to lead a coup against the government. 14 The 
result of banning Islamist and other opposition groups is that among the populations of CA 
countries, Islamists are not viewed as isolated from the opposition, but on the contrary, as 
those who express the pursuit for justice.15  
 
Besides as a result of oppressing political opposition, another reason for possible increased 
interest in IS in CA, is related to the warfare of IS in Syria and Iraq. In January 2015 the 
NGO International Crisis Group (ICG) estimated between 2,000 and 4,000 the number of CA 
citizens who had left for areas held by IS militants or otherwise support the extremist group's 
cause. ICG urged the CA governments to improve security coordination as well as to 
liberalize religious laws and provide greater economic opportunities for young people.16 The 
return of IS fighters to their home countries in CA could threaten domestic stability. 
According to a report by Egypt’s Ministry of Islamic Endowments, IS will start recruiting new 
members from CA (and from the Caucasus and Indonesia) since Arab states’ leaderships 
have begun an ideological and armed fight against IS. IS now focuses on regions such as 
CA to recruit new members because they feature a Muslim majority relatively unfamiliar with 
the group’s extremist and violent ideology. At the same time IS needs these regions not as 
part of its “caliphate” but for recruitment purposes, according to the report.17 Among 
thousands of Muslims from former Soviet CA republics some have joined IS, while others 
fight with al Qaeda. All of them, however, pose a threat to the weak CA countries as they 
confront stalling economies and a rise in Islamic radicalism. A particularly fertile ground for 
                                               
12 . Dyner, A. Legieć and K. Rękawek, Ready to Go? ISIS and Its Presumed Expansion into Central 
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13 D. Tynan, ‘Central Asia Is a Sitting Duck for Islamic State’, The Moscow Times (14 June 2015). 
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EDM, 12 / 161 (9 September, 2015). 
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such recruitment to Syria has been in the populous Fergana Valley.18 Allegedly, IS had 
allocated $70mn for the organization of terrorist acts in the Fergana Valley, which includes 
southern Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. IS would plan to destabilize the situation in Uzbekistan 
through southern Kyrgyzstan.19 
 
A potential increase in the popularity of IS or other radical Islamist factions will most likely 
instigate the CA authorities to strengthen their special services and raise funds for border 
protection. Especially Dushanbe exaggerates the threat from IS and Taliban in order to take 
further measures against domestic political opposition, as well as asking Moscow for military 
and other support.20 But Uzbekistan also demonstrates growing concern about the terrorist 
threat from IMU and IS. In spite of his firm independent course and having suspended 
Uzbekistan’s membership of the Russian-led CSTO military alliance, President Karimov has 
asked support from Russia and might do the same to NATO if the threat from IS becomes 
imminent. In December 2014 Karimov approached his Russian counterpart, Vladimir Putin, 
for assistance in combating the threat of extremism in Central Asia. Furthermore, Tashkent 
is an active member of the SCO, with a Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS), which 
discusses topics covering combating extremism and developing joint operations against IS 
threats. While many Western governments believe that Uzbekistan in the past used the 
threat of terrorism to crack down on domestic dissent, the transnational nature of IS 
represents a qualitatively different threat, demanding adequate measures.21 Likewise, 
Karimov’s Kyrgyz colleague is also worried about IS and also seeks cooperation and support 
from abroad. Kyrgyz President Almazbek Atambayev said Kyrgyzstan would like EU military 
assistance to help combat IS, posing a threat to Kyrgyzstan and other CA states. He claimed 
that IS announced one of the provinces of the Islamic caliphate will be created in CA. 
Atambayev added that so far only Russia has provided assistance to Kyrgyzstan in the form 
of supplies of weapons and ammunition.22 Considering the overspill of terrorism and 
radicalism from CA to its own territory, but also to maintain or even increase its political clout 
on these CA countries, Russia supports its CA neighbours in the fight against terrorist 
organizations by helping them to strengthen border control, support for local special services 
and by use of the CSTO Rapid Reaction Forces.23 
Drugs trafficking 
The Kremlin considers illicit drugs from Afghanistan as a rapidly swelling threat for Russia’s 
national security. Moscow has criticised the Western forces in Afghanistan for failing to 
eradicate narcotics production in this country, which has increased almost tenfold since the 
Western invasion against Taliban-Afghanistan in 2001. Tajikistan is the primary transit 
country for Afghan narcotics going to entering Russia and Eastern Europe. After the 
withdrawal of Russian border troops in 2005, Tajikistan has received support from Russia, 
the USA, the OSCE and the UN to improve its border forces. However, Dushanbe’s border 
security capacity has not been strengthened very much, due to a political unwillingness but 
especially because of widespread corruption with Tajik government officials involved in the 
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drugs trade. In December 2014 the USA supported Kyrgyzstan in its counter-drugs fight by 
delivering two border posts, enabling a greater presence of the Kyrgyz State Border Service 
in the remote regions and improving their capacity to interdict illicit trafficking. The USA 
announced in spring 2015 to also support Uzbekistan by delivering equipment (patrol boats 
and vehicles) for counter drugs operations.24. 
Regional armed conflict: Afghanistan 
The national interests of stabilizing Central Asia, in connection with that of further regional 
integration, are especially related to the future of Afghanistan. This element of the security 
documents clearly demonstrates the interdependent relationship between national interests, 
threats and ensuring national security, which all make reference to a stable Central Asia, 
and hence to a possible forceful obstacle to that, Afghanistan. With the USA and NATO 
having withdrawn most of their forces from Afghanistan in 2014, the Central Asian states 
have become increasingly nervous, since they are the ones that have to cope with terrorism 
(Taliban, Al Qaida and IS) and narcotics from Afghanistan. In March 2015 a UN envoy 
reported that IS had moved into Afghanistan.25 In August 2015 the Katibat Imam Bukhari – 
an Uzbek-dominated militant battalion fighting alongside IS in Syria – pledged allegiance to 
newly appointed Afghan Taliban leader, Mulla Akhtar Mansoor, who succeeded Mullah 
Omar. The group is a former IMU militant division which joined IS in 2014.26 Hence, there is 
a connection between a CA terrorist group, fighting in Syria for IS, which also supports the 
Taliban in Afghanistan. This unfolds ties between Islamist terrorist groupings in CA, the 
Middle East and Afghanistan. Activities from IS in Afghanistan and in the CA states could 
become an imminent threat to Central Asia. 
 
To counter the threats from Afghanistan a twofold policy seems to have emerged. On the 
one hand CA states are reinforcing their borders. On the other hand some of the CA 
countries, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in particular, are increasingly cooperating with, and 
getting more and more dependent on Russia for their security against an overspill of 
terrorism and violence from Afghanistan. The latter I will describe under ‘Regional CA 
security cooperation’. In October 2014 Tajikistan made public that it had built a second line 
of defence along its border with Afghanistan due to deterioration of the military and political 
situation in Afghanistan’s Kunduz Province, which borders Tajikistan. The Tajik MoD 
together with other security service structures had completed work along the border and 
additional forces were deployed there. In October 2015 Russia stated that it could re-
establish security operations to guard the Tajik-Afghan border but that would depend on 
Tajik decision-making. Until then, The Tajik authorities only requested technical assistance, 
in the framework of the CSTO. Until 2005 Russian border guards secured the Tajik-Afghan 
border, but were withdrawn that year at the request of Dushanbe.27 In 2014 Turkmen border 
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guards repeatedly battled the Taliban, including two clashes that apparently left six troops 
dead. In response, troops added wire fencing and dug ditches on vulnerable stretches of the 
border with Afghanistan. As of February 2015 border troops from Russia and Uzbekistan 
started helping Turkmenistan to guard its border against militant incursions from 
Afghanistan. Turkmenistan has taken various steps to address the rise of Taliban and IS 
units in northern Afghanistan, including mobilizing reserve troops and carrying out incursions 
into Afghan territory.28 Uzbekistan announced in January 2015 it was taking additional 
measures to strengthen its border with Afghanistan, due to reports of an increasing number 
of unknown militant groups and drug smugglers gathered in northern Afghanistan. According 
to Uzbekistan’s Committee on State Border Protection, the 137-km border was heavily 
protected and guarded to prevent military incursions of any kind.29 
Regional border, ethnic, water and energy disputes 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan demonstrate recurring clashes on borders, water and 
energy. The relations are often tense. In October 2014 Kyrgyz President Atambayev 
declared that his country would be cutting off its ties not only with Uzbekistan, but also with 
Tajikistan, because these two neighbours were allegedly attempting to thwart Kyrgyzstan’s 
efforts to reach self-sufficiency in energy and transportation infrastructure in the near future. 
The president also said that Uzbekistan’s main purpose for turning off the natural gas supply 
to Kyrgyzstan was to destabilize the situation in the country.30 In April 2014, Tashkent 
unilaterally had cut off natural gas supplies to Kyrgyzstan, allegedly because the existing 
supply contract left no room for the change of ownership, considering that KyrgyzGas had 
come into the hands of Russia’s Gazprom.31  
 
Regarding border conflicts, the very principle of territorial and administrative division along 
national lines is alien to the history of Central Asia. These states were not formed on an 
ethnic or national principle as the very concept of “nationality” was understood only in 
relative terms. Therefore, not a single border between the CA countries or between them 
and Afghanistan resembles borders like those in Europe. Instead, they are frontiers, with 
members of the same ethnic and religious groups on both sides. Borders were drawn 
arbitrarily, without taking ethnic and political realities into account. As a result, Central Asia 
features many disputed areas. Another complicating factor of the border disputes is the fact 
that there are numerous small ethnic enclaves inside the neighbouring states, which can 
always be subject to pressure by cutting off roads, water or power.32 Border conflicts – 
especially involving Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan – are a revolving problem in CA. 
Border area disputes in the Ferghana Valley – between Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan – have not only seen clashes between local communities of the respective 
countries, but are also noteworthy for involving armed skirmishes between border troops. 
The disputes have led to prolonged closures of borders and tense security conditions that 
have weakened Central Asia’s already poor inter-state collaboration as well as hindered the 
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growth of intra- and inter-regional trade.33 Regularly, tensions are high and rising along 
Kyrgyzstan’s borders with Uzbekistan as well as Tajikistan. The borders have not been fully 
demarcated by the countries involved since independence. Border skirmishes have 
repeatedly escalated to the point of people throwing rocks, border guards firing at people, 
blocking highways, cutting off water supplies, and building walls on territory others claim is 
not theirs. Border disputes routinely threaten to destabilize the situation in CA and overload 
the regimes with yet another problem. The CA governments are under pressure to try to 
reach agreements before these disputes get out of control.34 
 
Another form of regional disputes are those on water and energy. In April 2015, the CASA-
1000 project (Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan) got on the move. The 
construction of this large-scale electricity transmission project plans to facilitate the export of 
electricity produced via hydro-power in CA to consumers in South Asia. However, the 
downstream CA republics, which are not a part of CASA-1000 (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and 
Turkmenistan), are highly concerned by this project. These downstream countries share 
upstream Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan’s river resources. Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan fear that the CASA-1000 infrastructure results in further construction of 
additional hydro-electric plants and hydro-dam capacities by Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
depriving them of water. Moreover, the dissatisfaction of the downstream countries is also 
caused by Tajikistan’s and Kyrgyzstan’s failure to sign the two main United Nations 
conventions that regulate cross-boundary water resources.35 
 
Concerning energy, a prominent example is that Uzbekistan complains about Tajikistan’s 
Rogun hydro power plant project. According to Tashkent, the Rogun power plant “does not 
meet commonly adopted international standards and poses a threat to CA’s fragile 
ecological balance”. The Rogun power plant is for Tajikistan a solution to the energy 
independence and a tool for economic growth, making Tajikistan a major exporter of 
electricity. However, the economy of Uzbekistan is heavily dependent on agriculture. More 
than 90 percent of its fresh water is currently used for irrigation purposes. The Uzbeks 
expect that Rogun will cause problems for Uzbekistan's agricultural sector, because a giant 
reservoir behind the Rogun Dam would affect the flow of water to its cotton fields. It would 
have a serious negative impact on agricultural production as crop growing in Uzbekistan is 
water intensive. Although Dushanbe insists that this energy project must be carried out, it is 
also faced with the fact that Uzbekistan is currently Tajikistan's only supplier of natural gas. 
As a punishment for continuing the Rogun plant, Uzbekistan repeatedly stopped the natural 
gas exports to Tajikistan, refused to allow the transit of Kyrgyz and Turkmen electricity 
through its power grid and blocked the transit of all rail freight into Tajikistan. If Tajikistan and 
Uzbekistan would agree on energy cooperation, electricity might become cheaper, while 
irrigation could be better managed. However, such a scenario appears unlikely due to the 
political-loaded positions on both sides.36 
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Assessment 
The enumeration of threats, mentioned in CA security documents – armed paramilitary 
groupings; separatism, extremism and terrorism; arms and drugs trafficking; regional armed 
conflict (Afghanistan); regional border, ethnic, water and energy conflicts – gives evidence of 
a realistic approach of the CA governments towards the current security issues in the region. 
However, when it comes to countering these threats, the weaknesses and inconsistencies of 
the formal CA security policy become evident. To a certain extent, the aforementioned 
threats are caused by the CA regimes themselves. For instance, political opposition groups 
are often described as terrorists, and/or blamed to be connected to IS, as was the case with 
the armed upraise in Tajikistan in September 2015. Furthermore, there is hardly any effort 
towards improving social-economic circumstances, which would take away grounds for 
(Islamic) radicalization. Moreover, the CA governments are themselves responsible for 
regional border, water and energy disputes. Although aware of the threats caused by their 
own actions, the CA rulers do not seem to have much incentives for solving them 
constructively and long-lasting. As long as the CA authorities do not wish to admit that they 
are – at least partly – themselves to blame for a number of the threats they face, it is unlikely 
that these threats will be countered effectively. 
 
Ensuring national security 
In order to warrant national security, the CA states state in their security documents that 
using their law enforcement and armed forces is a method, but that also non-force measures 
– in the political, societal and economic domains – are taken. Furthermore, they recognize 
that regional CA security cooperation is another vital aspect for ensuring national security. 
Law enforcement and armed forces 
The crackdown by the Tajik government of the violence around Dushanbe of September 
2015 is an example that the CA law enforcement agencies and armed forces are capable of 
repelling attacks from Islamist and other opposing groups from Afghanistan or domestically. 
But they are unlikely to prevent the ideological influence and internal subversion that their 
own governments have created by their repressive approaches to Islamic groups and 
political opposition. The Islamist threat is an ideological rather than a security threat, but the 
CA governments only reply by using force and oppression. 
Non-force measures 
The more immediate threats for CA are not of a military but of a social-economic nature, e.g. 
social unrest, as a result of a waning economy, a worsening of the environmental situation, a 
deterioration of health of the population, and of education, as well as the presence of 
extremist religious groups, wishing to overthrow the current government. All these threats 
are connected to the stability of the current political regimes and of the social-economic 
development of the countries. If poverty and unemployment increase, this could result in a 
diminishing trust in the political leadership. Furthermore, poverty is a well-known ground for 
extremism and subsequent terrorism. According to researchers at the Exeter Central Asian 
Studies Network, CA citizens joining IS are more motivated by political reasons than 
religious factors. Lack of opportunities to protest, anti-secular political ideas, exposure to 
violence, and feelings of alienation and exclusion – compounded by a context of poor 
education and authoritarian regimes – as the key drivers pushing individuals, especially 
youth, towards IS. Hence, apparently, non-religious reasons for Central Asians to join IS are 
more important than religious factors.37 To counter these threats, the CA states recognize 
that political and social-economic actions have to be taken. However, the intentions have not 
been met with many results. Corruption remains high in the CA states, as well as poverty 
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and unemployment. Furthermore, the authoritarian nature of the CA regimes, with no serious 
political opposition allowed, is not helpful either in creating a sound and stable situation. 
Regional CA security cooperation 
Security cooperation in the CA region is organized through the CSTO, with Russia in the 
lead, and to a lesser extent through the SCO, with firstly China and secondly Russia as 
principle actors. A common CA security policy and or corresponding organization does not 
exist. I recognize two reasons for this. First, because the CA states feel comfortable in the 
current security settings of CSTO and SCO, which saves them from organizing their own 
collective security entity. Secondly, and probably even more likely, because of the lack of 
unity among the CA states. The aforementioned account of CA regional disputes on water, 
energy and borders clearly demonstrates that there is no such thing as a united CA 
approach; not on these issues, nor on security. Moreover, in August 2015 Uzbek President 
Islam Karimov once again stated that Uzbekistan will never agree to let foreign states deploy 
military bases on its territory. Karimov said that Uzbekistan will never join any military-
political blocs and let its soldiers serve abroad.38 In 2012 Uzbekistan – once again – 
withdrew from the CSTO. Furthermore, Turkmenistan, with its policy of permanent neutrality, 
consequently also refrains from multilateral security cooperation. Moscow fills this collective 
CA security gap by providing bilateral military support. Within the CSTO Kazakhstan comes 
second in delivering troops for exercises, after Russia. Also, Astana and Moscow maintain 
intensive bilateral military ties. Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan are also close allies of Russia in 
CA, but more importantly, are highly dependent on the Kremlin. 
 
Due to pressure from Moscow, Kyrgyzstan did not prolong its agreement with the United 
States and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) on the continued use of the 
Manas Transit Center airbase. In June 2014 they left the base. In turn, Russia agreed to 
provide military and technical support to Kyrgyzstan in the form of direct assistance. 
Furthermore, Russia continued to keep its own airbase at Kant, near Bishkek, intact and, is 
allegedly mulling over the establishment of a second similar base in Osh by 2017, close to 
the border between Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. In February 2015, Russia announced 
rearmament of the airbase Kant with modernized aircraft. Kant, completely Russian, is a 
component of the CSTO’s Collective Rapid Deployment Force. It is also involved in ensuring 
the security of the CSTO member countries, especially considering NATO’s withdrawal from 
Afghanistan. In June 2015 the defence ministers of Russia and Kyrgyzstan discussed 
bilateral military/defence cooperation and the current situation in Afghanistan. Russia’s 
minister, Shoigu, stated that Russian and CA armed forces should be prepared for a 
negative development of the situation in Afghanistan. He noted that Russia helps Kyrgyzstan 
in strengthening its army. 39 Kyrgyz President Atambayev is all in favour of closer political, 
economic and military ties with Russia. But consequently, the Kremlin’s influence on 
Kyrgyzstan’s domestic politics will also gain further weight. 
 
Concerning Russian-Tajik military cooperation, in October 2013 Tajikistan ratified a deal to 
extend the presence of Russia’s military base, the former 201st division, in Tajikistan until 
2042. The military base, which stations 7,000 troops, is Russia’s biggest military garrison 
abroad. In April 2015 Russia announced plans to increase the number of troops stationed in 
Tajikistan to 9,000 over the next five years and to provide more military equipment. The 
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Russian army base in Tajikistan is also a component of the CSTO’s Collective Rapid 
Deployment Force, and will in time of crisis give immediate support to the Tajik Armed 
Forces. In June 2015 Tajik President Rahmon received Russia’s Minister of Defence, 
Shoygu. They discussed defence/military and technical bilateral cooperation, strengthening 
Tajikistan’s common border with Afghanistan, rearmament of the Tajik Armed Forces, the 
current situation in the CA region and in Afghanistan, as well as coordination of actions 
between the Tajik security forces and Russia’s military base in Tajikistan. In October 2015 
Russia said to deploy attack and military-transport helicopters to beef up its military 
presence in Tajikistan amid rising insecurity in northern Afghanistan. The aircraft would be 
used to provide air cover for military columns, deliver airborne forces and cargo, carry out 
reconnaissance missions, and medical evacuation.40 
Assessment 
According to the CA security documents, ensuring national security is accomplished by a 
mixture of using law enforcement and armed forces, non-force measures, e.g. in the political, 
societal and economic areas, as well as by regional CA security cooperation. However, the 
execution of the policy lines of non-force measures and regional CA security cooperation are 
underdeveloped to say the least. By far, the use of law enforcement and of the armed forces, 
to crackdown opposition and terrorist movements, seems to be the key instrument of CA 
governments to ensure national security, and hence also their survival. At the moment this 
approach, of violence and oppression, works. However, should domestic opposition 
increase, for instance because of a further deterioration of social-economic conditions, then 
using force might not be sufficient anymore. Furthermore, as to security cooperation, 
dependence on Russia is a weak approach, because one can never know if a partner will 
remain reliable. Hence, for external and internal security – the two are more and more 
connected – the CA regimes should show a genuine desire to establish regional CA 
cooperation. 
Outlook 
I conclude with a look ahead on how some elements of CA security might develop. 
Islamic extremism a threat for CA? 
For many years already, Moscow has used the threat of a possible jihadist insurgency 
spilling over the border from Afghanistan into Central Asia to scare the post-Soviet secular 
authoritarian leaders of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan 
into submission; i.e. to accept Russia’s political clout in exchange for security guarantees. At 
present, the activities of IS and its interests seem far off from Central Asia. In fact this 
extremist group is encouraging jihadist activists to the battlefields in Syria and Iraq, where 
many of them are killed in action. In doing so, IS is possibly reducing the present terrorist 
threat inside Central Asia, Russia and Europe. Nevertheless, the remainder of the IS fighters 
might return from the Middle East to Russia’s North Caucasus and to Central Asia. For 
instance, Uzbekistan, a frontline state bordering Afghanistan, faces the potential terrorist and 
insurgency threat of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which has associated itself 
with IS. Therefore, in spite of the current lack of threat from jihadist insurgency, it cannot be 
ruled out that these elements could develop into a serious security threat for Russia and CA. 
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Cooperation on Afghanistan 
In 2013, Kazakhstan called for cooperation of NATO with the SCO.41 However, this Western 
military alliance has always rejected working with SCO and CSTO. Due to imminent threats 
of security, arising from Afghanistan, the time of reluctance towards cooperation for East 
(Russia, China, Central Asia, CSTO, SCO) and West (USA, NATO, EU),no longer exists. 
Regarding Afghanistan, East and West face the same threats: terrorism by Taliban, Al Qaida 
and IS, as well as drugs production and trafficking. The USA and other actors in the West do 
not want the Taliban to return to power in Kabul, possibly creating a repetition of ‘9/11’. 
Russia and CA are in the vicinity or even bordering troubled Afghanistan. Hence, East and 
West will continue to be engaged in the security of Afghanistan and the Central Asian region, 
and cooperation between them is therefore inevitable and essential. Cooperation of 
NATO/EU, Central Asia, Russia and SCO/CSTO could lead to strengthening stability and 
security in Afghanistan and throughout the Central Asian region. Unfortunately, so far the 
described East-West cooperation on Afghanistan has not yet gotten under way. 
Social-economic measures to counter instability and terrorism 
Unemployment, poverty, bad education and medical care can develop into not only political 
instability in CA, but also into support for radical Islam groupings, such as IS, conducting 
terrorist attacks. More powers for security services and other law enforcement organs and a 
further crack-down on democracy and human rights are not the solution. To ensure a stable 
political environment, political and social-economic reforms have to be implemented. In the 
cases of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan, a succession plan of the long-time serving presidents 
Nazarbayev and Karimov should be prepared. Moreover, political reforms, enhancing 
participation by opposition groups and granting more power to Parliament and Government, 
should be drafted, also in the other CA countries. This, in order to soften the current overflow 
of (single, authoritarian) Presidential rule. In terms of economic reforms, the CA states 
should take measures in the field of education, health care, employment and improved social 
guarantees for disadvantaged members of society. It is likely that the current established 
political regimes in CA are not willing to reduce or even less to give-up their powers. 
However, without the aforementioned political and social-economic reforms the stability and 




                                               
41 ‘Kazakhs urge NATO dialogue with SCO’, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (2 February 2013) 
www.rferl.org/content/kazakhstan-nato-sco-munich/24891375.html (accessed 10 November, 2015). 
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Foreign Policy Concepts Common views in all 
security documents 
NATIONAL INTERESTS 
Adhere to the principles of 
international law, e.g. by 
pursuing a policy of 
cooperation  and good-
neighbourly relations ; non-
interference i n internal 
affairs; and non-use of 
force  
 
• The inviolability  of the 
constitutional order , 
sovereignty  and 
territorial  integrity 
• Social cohesion  and 
political and economic 
stability  
• Domestic and regional 





• Non-interference ; 
peaceful settlement  of 
disputes; 
• No-first use of armed 
force ; no enemies ; 
• No territorial claims ; 
inviolability of borders . 
 
• Respect for 
sovereignty , territorial  
integrity and non-
interference  into 
internal affairs, peaceful 
settlement of disputes, 
non-use of force  or 
threat to use force 
• Strengthening  the 
state’s international 
position  and its image  
abroad 
• Strengthening good-
neighbourly relations  
• Reinforcing  the national 
economy  
 
• Respect for sovereignty, 
and territorial integrity 
• International cooperation 
• Good-neighbourly 
relations 
• Non-interference in 
internal affairs 
• Non-use of force 
• Political and economic 
stability 
 
THREATS TO SECURITY 
Internal threats      
Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan have similar 
entries that armed 
paramilitary groupings are 
forbidden  and that political 
parties  and other civil 
organizations are not 
• Separatism, 
extremism, terrorism 
• Crime , corruption, arms 
and drugs trafficking 
• Environmental problems, 
social-political 
• Extremism, terrorism, 
separatism 
• Supply of arms to illegal 
armed groups 
• Sabotage  
• Drugs  trafficking 
Not applicable • Armed paramilitary 
groupings 
• Separatism, extremism, 
terrorism 
• Arms and drugs 
trafficking 
                                               
42 The citations are mostly not literally derived from the different security documents, but are adapted by the author, as is the use of bold text. The grouping of 
related entries as used here is for the purpose of clarity and does not necessarily correspond with the original documents. 
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• Illegal migration  
 
 
External threats      
Not applicable • Breaches of 
sovereignty  and 
territorial integrity 
• Regional armed 
conflicts,  in particular 
related to Afghanistan  
• Terrorism  
• Damage to the 
economic security  
• The incomplete 
delineation of state 
borders  and those of 
the Caspian Sea  
 
• CA regional political 
instability 
• CA regional  border, 
water, energy, ethnic 
and religious conflicts  
• Armed provocations 
• Terrorism, separatism 
and extremism 
• Proliferation  of 
weapons of mass 
destruction 
• Regional CA 
consequences of 
Afghanistan’s  situation 
• States  striving to 
influence  the CA region 
• Military build-up  by 
states in the region 
 
• Terrorism  
• Extremism  
• Illegal immigration  
• Drugs and arms  
trafficking 
• Information security 
• Regional CA conflict 
potential  on social-
economic problems, 




• Regional armed 
conflicts, in particular 
related to Afghanistan 
• Terrorism, extremism 
• CA regional border, 
water, energy, ethnic 
and religious conflicts 
 
ENSURING SECURITY 
• The CA President  is 
usually in charge of 
introducing martial law 
and a state of 
emergence 
• The CA Parliaments  
have in general the 
right to declare war 
and peace  and the 
deployment  of their 
Activities of law 
enforcement and armed 
forces , but also measures  
in scientific, technical, 
economic, political, ethical 
and other non-power areas . 
 
• Maintaining a defence 
capability  to counter the 
aforementioned threats 
• International 
cooperation ; bilateral 
and within organizations 
• Action against 
(proliferation  of) 
weapons of mass 
• Developing intra-
regional CA collective 
security cooperation  to 
diminish conflict 
• Promoting energy 
security  and energy 
independence  
 
• Activities of law 
enforcement and armed 
forces, but also non-
force action 
• regional CA security 
cooperation 
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Armed Forces abroad  
 
destruction 
• Preference for non-
military measures 
 
 
 
 
 
 
